I study transfers of control in a …rm having atomistic shareholders and one dominant minority blockholder (incumbent). A potential acquirer can try to negotiate a block trade with the incumbent. If the negotiations are successful, the control changes hands via a block trade. If the negotiations fail, the acquirer can launch a public tender o¤er. According to empirical evidence, companies with minority blockholders are widespread, and both types of transactions occur in such companies. However, the existing models that allow for acquiring control through a block trade never obtain tender o¤ers in equilibrium. In my model, asymmetry of information about the acquirer's ability to generate value leads to the negotiations failure and, hence, results in a tender o¤er for a range of parameters. In such an equilibrium, high ability acquirers take over the …rm by means of a tender o¤er, intermediate types negotiate a block trade, and low types do not attempt any transaction. This result provides an immediate explanation for higher target announcement returns in tender o¤ers as compared to block trades. The model also explains why takeover premiums and targets' stock price reaction to tender o¤ers may be higher in countries with stronger shareholder protection and predicts that better shareholder protection should result in a higher announcements returns for targets in block trade transactions as well. Finally, the paper obtains that transfers of corporate control in …rms with a dominant minority blockholder are more e¢ cient when shareholder protection is better and provides an argument against the mandatory bid rule in strong legal regimes.
Introduction
While the literature on transfers of corporate control is huge, insu¢ cient attention has been devoted to the issue of the choice of the control transfer mode. This paper considers a …rm with a dominant minority shareholder (incumbent blockholder, incumbent) and otherwise dispersed shareholders and examines the choice of an acquirer (raider) between taking the …rm over by means of a public tender o¤er and negotiating a block trade with the incumbent blockholder. Firms with large non-controlling (i.e., having less than 50% of the votes) shareholders are widespread. In Faccio and Lang (2002) sample of 5,232 European companies, about 92% of …rms had a shareholder with at least 5% of the voting rights, and the median largest block was 30% in terms of votes. In Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) sample of 2,980 East Asian companies, about 88% of …rms had a shareholder with greater than 5% voting rights, and the median largest block among such companies had about 20%. In Holderness (2009) sample of 375 listed U.S. …rms, 96% of the companies had a shareholder holding more than 5% of the votes, and the median size of the largest shareholder among such companies was 17%.
It is well known by now that large minority block trades are corporate control transactions: block purchasers pay substantial "control premiums" (Dyck and Zingales, 2004 ) and frequently initiate changes in the management and board of directors compositions (Barclay and Holderness, 1991) . While a block trade is sometimes the ultimate control transaction in a …rm with a large minority blockholder, public tender o¤ers occur in such …rms as well. In Barclay and Holderness (1991) sample of 106 negotiated block trades in the U.S., in 65 cases …rms were not acquired for at least a year after the block trade, while in 41 cases a block trade was followed by an acquisition of the remaining shares. In this latter subsample, tender o¤ers to other shareholders were made simultaneously with block trades in 14 cases. Holmén and Nivorozhkin (2012) , studying a sample of 195 Swedish non-…nancial companies …nd that both block trades (62 deals) and non-partial tender-o¤ers (28 deals) occur in companies with large blockholders.
While a target's characteristics may also a¤ect the choice of the control transfer mode, I argue in this paper that the acquirer's ability to generate value (or, at least, her perception about her ability) may explain when a block trade or a tender o¤er occurs. The paper has several contributions. First, it rationalizes the coexistence of tender o¤ers and block trades in equilibrium in …rms with a dominant minority blockholder. In particular, I argue that such coexistence cannot be explained in a model with symmetric information, essentially because the acquirer and the incumbent collectively would always prefer to exclude other shareholders from the deal. Zingales (1995) and Burkart et al (2000) allow for the choice between a block trade and a tender o¤er 1 , but in equilibrium the acquirer and the incumbent always trade the block. In both these papers information is symmetric. In my model, asymmetry of information about the acquirer's ability introduces imperfections into the bargaining between the acquirer and the incumbent, which may result in an acquisition via a tender o¤er in equilibrium.
Second, the paper explains why the target's stock price reaction to tender o¤ers is generally higher than that to block trade announcements, as one can conclude from the empirical literature.
Third, the model predicts that takeover premiums and announcement stock returns of targets in both tender o¤ers and block trades should be higher in countries with stronger shareholder protection, which is consistent with Rossi and Volpin (2004) .
Finally, the paper obtains that transfers of corporate control are more e¢ cient when shareholder protection is better and argues that the mandatory bid rule is bene…cial for e¢ ciency in weak legal regimes, but can be harmful when shareholder protection is strong.
Before providing intuition for the results of the paper, it is worthwhile elaborating on the ar-gument why symmetric information models fail to generate tender o¤ers in …rms with dispersed shareholders and a dominant minority blockholder in equilibrium. The total value generated by the party in control consists of security bene…ts (pro…ts, dividends) accruing to all shareholders and private bene…ts accruing to the controlling party only. Assume that, for a given controlling party, both security and private bene…ts the party generates are …xed, do not depend on the party's equity stake, and are common knowledge. In a tender o¤er, due to the classical free-rider problem (Grossman and Hart, 1980) , dispersed shareholders do not agree to sell to the acquirer at a price below the security bene…ts the acquirer would generate. In addition, it is natural and common in the literature to rule out "panic equilibria", in which dispersed shareholders sell to a raider at a price below the security bene…ts generated by the incumbent. 2 Thus, in a successful tender o¤er, the dispersed shareholders obtain at least the security bene…ts generated by the raider and even more when the incumbent-generated security bene…ts exceed those created by the raider. In contrast, if a block trade occurs, the dispersed shareholders always obtain just the security bene…ts generated by the raider. Hence, the small shareholders weakly gain from a tender o¤er as compared to a block trade. Given that both types of transactions create the same aggregate welfare (since we assumed that the private and security bene…ts generated by the raider do not depend on her stake), this implies that the incumbent and the acquirer weakly lose from a tender o¤er relative to a block trade. If one adds a cost of administering a tender o¤er (in reality such costs can be rather signi…cant) the preference for a block trade becomes strict. Allowing the incumbent to counterbid makes a tender o¤er game even less attractive for the incumbent-raider coalition, as it can only raise the equilibrium bid.
A symmetric information model with endogenous private and security bene…ts a la Burkart et al (2000) would also result in a block trade in equilibrium. In Burkart et al (2000) , the controlling party optimally chooses to generate more security bene…ts and extract less private bene…ts when his or her share is higher. A tender o¤er contest in their model is won by the raider and leads to an increase in the controlling party's share, which implies more security bene…ts and less private bene…ts. However, due to the free-riding behavior of dispersed shareholders, the whole increase in security bene…ts accrues to the latter. As a result, due to lower private bene…ts in the case of a tender o¤er, the acquirer and the incumbent collectively strictly prefer to trade the block.
In this paper, the acquirer's ability to generate value is her private information. Crucially, I assume that this information is "soft". The information asymmetry leads to a negotiations failure in equilibrium. Similarly to Zingales (1995) , I assume that the acquirer and the incumbent …rst try to negotiate a block trade, and if the negotiations fail, the acquirer can launch a tender o¤er to all shareholders. 3 It is also assumed that the bargaining is structured in such a way that the raider makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the incumbent. 4 Because they generate greater security bene…ts, higher types of raiders have a greater relative bene…t (lower relative loss) from acquiring 100% of the shares as opposed to buying just the incumbent's stake, for given tender o¤er and block trade prices. As a result, the following equilibrium structure emerges: the best acquirers launch a tender o¤er, intermediate quality acquirers do a block trade, and worst acquirers do not acquire control at all. The fundamental reason why high types fail to negotiate a block trade is the fact that the incumbent's outside option (disagreement payo¤) is private information of the raider. For given beliefs of the dispersed shareholders, if the incumbent rejects the raider's o¤er, low enough types of rejected raiders prefer to abstain from a tender o¤er, while high enough types prefer to bid. The equilibrium tender o¤er bid is lower than the equilibrium block price (per unit share). The latter, in turn, is lower than the incumbent's valuation of his block (per unit share). Thus, the incumbent agrees to accept the price below his valuation of the block, because he risks to obtain even less in a tender o¤er, if he refuses. High enough types of raiders (those who are ready to acquire the …rm in a tender o¤er) are unhappy with the terms of the block trade. They know that they can make the incumbent worse o¤ by launching a tender o¤er, and they would like to communicate this information to him in order to bring down the block price, but are unable to credibly do it, because the type is "soft" information. As a result, when the raider's type is su¢ ciently high, she essentially decides not to bargain with the incumbent and launches a tender o¤er.
The immediate implication of the described equilibrium structure is that the stock price reaction to tender o¤ers is higher than to block trades announcements. The result is simply due to the fact that it is higher quality types that acquire the company through a tender o¤er. This …nding is consistent with the empirical evidence. For example, Barclay and Holderness (1991) report a substantial di¤erence in cumulative abnormal returns between control transactions that eventually involved a tender o¤er and those in which a block trade was the ultimate control transaction. Similarly, Holmén and Nivorozhkin (2012) report a large di¤erence between announcement returns in non-partial tender o¤ers and block trades. In both papers, acquisition of 100% of shares is associated with higher abnormal returns.
Other empirical studies do not make a direct comparison of block trades and tender o¤ers. However, examining the papers on block trades and on tender o¤ers separately, we can make a rough indirect comparison. Martynova and Renneboog (2008) provide a convenient summary on the targets'stock returns around tender o¤er announcements found in numerous empirical studies. At the same time, Barclay and Holderness (1991), Kang and Kim (2008) , Allen and Phillips (2000) , Albuquerque and Schroth (2008) provide evidence on the target stock price reaction to block trades. The numbers, provided by Martynova and Renneboog are almost always higher than those found in the block trades studies.
The model also obtains that takeover premiums and the targets' stock price reaction to both tender o¤ers and block trades are higher in countries with better shareholder protection. This happens because, for a given ownership structure, stengthening shareholder protection reduces private bene…ts, thereby making takeovers pro…table only for acquirers of su¢ ciently high quality. Notice, that in my model both the acquirer and the target are from the same legal environment. Hence, my results about the e¤ects of shareholder protection are con…ned to domestic deals, and an empirical study that could properly test these results should control for that. Rossi and Volpin (2004) do obtain a higher takeover premiums for targets from countries with better shareholder protection, and the e¤ect of the di¤erence between the acquirer and target countries' shareholder protection turned out to be statistically insigni…cant. Bris and Cabolis (2008) do not …nd any statistically signi…cant e¤ect of the target country's shareholder protection, but their empirical speci…cations do not allow to look at domestic deals separately from cross-border deals. 5 Cross-country research on wealth e¤ects of block trades is much scarcer. Liao (2010) …nds no statistically signi…cant e¤ect of shareholder protection on stock price reaction to block trades, but, again, the study does not look at domestic deals separately. 6 An important result of my paper is greater e¢ ciency of takeovers in countries with stronger shareholder protection. As Burkart et al (2012) argue, "existing theory o¤ers little guidance as to why the takeover outcome might be more e¢ cient in countries with stronger legal investor protection." 7 In my model, better legal protection impedes ine¢ cient takeovers, but does not prevent e¢ cient transfers of control. Stronger legal protection reduces the raider's gain from a takeover through a reduction in private bene…ts. Since the raider's payo¤ is strictly increasing in her type, lower types are …rst to withdraw from the takeover market when shareholder protection strengthens. However, without the possibility of block trades a too strong legal protection would also fend away some raiders who are more e¢ cient than the incumbent. 8 In my model, block trades "save"e¢ ciency. In the absence of the mandatory bid rule the acquirer can always purchase only the incumbent's block. This always brings her a positive payo¤ whenever she values the block more than the incumbent, which is equivalent to the acquirer being more e¢ cient than the incumbent in my setup. Thus, an important caveat is that the e¢ ciency implications of shareholder protection in my model are con…ned to …rms with a large non-controlling shareholder.
Burkart et al (2012) also obtain a positive e¤ect of legal investor protection on the e¢ ciency of takeovers. However, in their model the rationale for that is totally di¤erent. Stronger investor protection increases the pledgeable income of the bidder, thereby reducing the role of internal funds in …nancing a takeover. As a result, as investor protection improves, bidder's e¢ ciency as opposed to availability of internal funds becomes more important in determining the winner in a takeover contest.
Many countries'legislation contains some version of a mandatory bid rule (MBR), according to which an acquirer of a stake above certain threshold (usually 30% or one third of the votes) must publicly o¤er an 'equitable price'for the remaining shares. 9 Yet, there are still countries that have not introduced such a rule (U.S. is among such countries). MBR implies, in particular, that if acquisition of the incumbent block triggers a mandatory bid, the raider has to o¤er dispersed shareholders at least the price she paid for shares in the block trade. To the extent that blocks of the size below the threshold carry su¢ cient private bene…ts of control, my model 5 Instead, their study focuses on the e¤ects of the di¤erence in shareholder protection between the acquirer's and target's countries. There is also a study by Goergen and Renneboog (2004) who obtain that UK targets experience signi…cantly greater returns than targets from Continental Europe. 6 There are several studies devoted to a speci…c country, rather than doing cross-country comparisons. The average stock price reaction to block trades documented for Germany (Franks and Mayer, 2001), France (Banejee et al.,1998) and Poland (Trojanowski, 2008 ) is lower than that found in the U.S. studies (Barclay and Holderness, 1991; Kang and Kim, 2008; Allen and Phillips, 2000) . 7 Burkart et al (2012), p.2. 8 This e¤ect is due to the information asymmetry about the security bene…ts the acquirer generates. As At, Burkart, and Lee (2011) show, with such information asymmetry, takeover activity completely collapses when the acquirer is unable to extract private bene…ts. 9 'Equitable price'is usually de…ned as the maximum price that the o¤eror paid for the same securities over a prespeci…ed period (usually several months) prior to the mandatory bid.
is not (qualitatively) a¤ected by the presence/absence of MBR, at least for those …rms in which the incumbent's stake is smaller than or not much above the threshold. 10 As can be inferred from the data on median largest block sizes mentioned in second paragraph of the Introduction, such situations are frequent.
On the other hand, if acquiring control from the incumbent triggers a mandatory bid, my model provides an argument against MBR in strong legal regimes. As in many other papers that examine the e¤ect of the MBR (e.g., Bebchuk, 1994; Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 2000; Berglöf and Burkart, 2003) , my paper …nds that, whereas the MBR prevents some ine¢ cient takeovers from happening, it may also impede e¢ cient takeovers. However, in contrast to the earlier literature, I derive an explicit relationship between the quality of shareholder protection and the desirability of MBR. I show that under strong legal protection of shareholders, the negative e¤ect of the MBR prevails. The reason is that in strong legal regimes ine¢ cient takeovers are unlikely even without MBR, and, hence, the negative aspect of the rule (nonoccurrence of e¢ cient takeovers) prevails.
My work is related to the literature on signaling in tender o¤ers. In traditional tender o¤er models, signaling is generally impossible. By a traditional model I mean a setup, in which a tender o¤er is the only means of acquiring control, the bidder's strategy consists of only choosing the bid price and, possibly, the restriction on the percentage of shares she o¤ers to buy, target shareholders are atomistic and accept the bid with certainty when indi¤erent. Burkart and Lee (2010) show that in such type of models, full revelation of the bidder's type never occurs in equilibrium. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that if one applies the equilibrium re…nement based on the Grossman and Perry (1986) notion of credible beliefs, the only equilibrium that remains is a pooling equilibrium. Separation (perhaps, partial) of types becomes possible once one introduces additional features into a basic setup. For example, Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) show that signaling with a bid price is possible when dispersed shareholders can randomize between tendering and not tendering when they are indi¤erent. Chowdhry and Jegadeesh (1994) demonstrate that signaling is possible through toehold formation. Burkart and Lee (2010) present several other setups in which signaling is possible. They show that if the raider has a positive bargaining power vis-a-vis dispersed shareholders, full revelation of the bidder's type is possible. They also show that a fully revealing equilibrium can emerge if the bidder can commit to relinquish any fraction of her private bene…ts. 11 In our model, the feature that leads to a (partial) separation of types is the presence of a large minority blockholder and the possibility to acquire control through purchasing his share.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In sections 3 and 4 I solve the model under the assumptions of symmetric and asymmetric information respectively. Section 5 considers implications of the model for announcement stock price reactions, e¢ ciency of takeovers, and the e¤ects of the mandatory bid rule. Section 6 discusses two extensions of the model. Section 7 concludes.
The model
There is a …rm run by a manager (incumbent), who is also the largest shareholder of the …rm. His share is , while the rest of equity is dispersed. The …rm has a one-share-one-vote structure. The incumbent is in control over the …rm and generates value X I . Out of this value, he can divert up to fraction ' 2 (0; 1) to derive private bene…ts at no cost. So, if the incumbent diverts ' private bene…ts are X I , while the rest is security bene…ts available to all shareholders, (1 )X I . 12 Parameter ' re ‡ects the strength of legal shareholder protection in the country. Thus, I am following Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) and At, Burkart, and Lee (2011) in modeling shareholder protection. I assume that < 1=2, which implies that someone else could potentially gather a controlling stake bypassing the incumbent. There is a potential acquirer (raider) who can generate value X if in control. Similarly to the incumbent, she splits X into private bene…ts X and security bene…ts (1 )X. While X is known to the raider, both the incumbent and the dispersed shareholders only know that X is distributed uniformly on [0; X]. The crucial assumption is that X is "soft" information. The distribution of X is common knowledge.
This assumption is made to simplify the analysis and does not qualitatively a¤ect the results of the model. It simply says that the incumbent is neither worse nor better than the average acquirer, thereby introducing certain symmetry between the incumbent and a potential raider. This is going to rule out situations in which the expected X of an acquirer who launches a tender o¤er is lower than X I . This will imply that the equilibrium tender o¤er bid will be equal to the expected security bene…ts of an acquirer who makes a tender o¤er.
There is no discounting in the model; all participants are risk-neutral. The sequence of the events is as follows. t = 1: The raider makes a take-it-or-leave it o¤er to the incumbent for the entire incumbent's share. 13 She suggests price p per unit share. The price o¤ered is known only to the acquirer and the incumbent. If the o¤er is accepted, the block trade occurs, the acquirer becomes the new controlling party, and the game proceeds to t = 3. 14 If the o¤er is rejected, the game proceeds to t = 2: 15 t = 2: Following a rejection of the block trade o¤er, the raider can make a public tender o¤er to all shareholders at price b. I assume that a tender o¤er must be unconditional and unrestricted. If a tender o¤er is made, each shareholder, including the incumbent blockholder, 1 2 Thus, for given (and we will see that the party in control always chooses = '), there is a perfect positive correlation between security bene…ts and private bene…ts of the party in control. In Section 6 we discuss a model in which private bene…ts are deterministic and the same regardless of who is in control, and the information asymmetry is only about the security bene…ts the raider is able to generate. This modi…cation does not change the qualitative results of the model. In contrast, a negative correlation between private bene…ts and security bene…ts may kill tender o¤ers in equilibrium, if private bene…ts are too responsive to security bene…ts (see Section 6) . 1 3 For simplicity, I do not allow partial sales of the block, see a brief discussion at the end of the section. 1 4 Thus, we assume that either the country does not have a mandatory bid rule, or that the incumbent block's size is below the threshold that triggers a mandatory bid. The e¤ects of the mandatory bid rule are discussed in Section 6. 1 5 I could provide the acquirer with the option to make a tender o¤er straight away, without prior negotiations. Such a setup would lead to observationally equivalent equilibria. decides non-cooperatively whether to tender his shares or not. Following Grossman and Hart (1980) and much of the subsequent literature, I assume that each atomistic shareholder treats his own decision as having no e¤ect on the outcome of the tender o¤er (i.e., considers himself pivotal with probability zero). Furthermore, I assume that the incumbent blockholder cannot counterbid (e.g., because he has no resources). If, as a result of the tender o¤er, the acquirer ends up with obtaining either at least 50% of the shares or the entire incumbent's share, she gains permanent control over the company. 16 Otherwise, the incumbent keeps control. If the acquirer decides not to make a tender o¤er, the incumbent keeps control. t = 3. The party in control generates security bene…ts (1 )Y and private bene…ts Y , where Y is either X=2 or X depending on who is in control.
I would like to emphasize that the assumption of no countering by the incumbent is not crucial and is made for simplicity. In Section 6 I discuss an extension with a counter-bid by the incumbent and argue that the qualitative results remain intact. To put it brie ‡y, the possibility of countering does not eliminate the fundamental reason why the bargaining between the raider and the incumbent may fail: the fact that the incumbent's outside option in bargaining (disagreement payo¤) is the raider's private knowledge, because only the raider knows whether she is going to abstain or launch a tender o¤er following the incumbent's refusal.
Assumption 2. Faced with a tender o¤er, dispersed shareholders do not play weakly dominated strategies.
This assumption rules out situations when the raider o¤ers the price equal to the posttakeover security bene…ts she would generate and greater than the security bene…ts created by the incumbent, but an atomistic shareholder does not tender his share. In such a situation, if the shareholder expects the takeover to succeed with certainty, he is indi¤erent between tendering and not. However, 'not tendering' is weakly dominated: if holders of more than 50% of the shares do not tender, the shareholder is worse o¤ refusing to tender. Assumption 3. When the incumbent is indi¤erent between selling and not selling, he prefers to sell his share.
This assumption is made for simplicity and refers to the incumbent's decision both at t = 1 and t = 2.
Assumptions 2 and 3 together with the control transfer rule in a tender o¤er (50% or the entire incumbent's share) and the assumptions that the raider's private o¤er can only be for the whole incumbent's stake and the public bid must be unrestricted will essentially imply that only two successful outcomes of the control transfer are possible: either the raider purchases the entire incumbent's block in a negotiated deal, or she buys 100% of the company. While it might seem that I am imposing too rigid assumptions on the available strategies, they are arguably not crucial for the qualitative results of the model. What is really needed for my results is that a successful tender o¤er leads to a greater ultimate acquirer's share compared with a block trade, which sounds very plausible and is supported by the real life data. Thus, neither allowing for partial block sales, nor permitting o¤ers restricted to 50% of the shares should be crucial for the model. For concreteness, let us assume that if the raider is indi¤erent between abstaining and acquiring control, she abstains.
Symmetric information benchmark
As a benchmark, let us …rst solve the model as if X were common knowledge. We will see that, in this case, in equilibrium, the raider never prefers a tender o¤er to occur and, if a tender o¤er involves even a very small cost, the preference for a block trade becomes strict.
Since there is no cost of private bene…t extraction in the model, at t = 3 the party in control always steals as much value as possible, i.e., sets = ', unless it has 100% of the company. In the latter case, the raider (only the raider can end up having 100% of the votes) is indi¤erent among all feasible values of . To resolve this indeterminacy I assume that the raider sets = ' even when she acquires the entire company. 17 This is actually not crucial, but simply convenient. What I really need is that the raider can acquire the whole company by bidding (1 ')X (unless X < X=2, see below). If all shareholders except one atomistic shareholder tender their shares to the bidder, the bidder will strictly prefer to set = ' at t = 3, and, hence, dispersed shareholders will indeed agree to tender for (1 ')X.
In order to solve the game, let us make the assumption of 'no-panic-equilibria', common in the literature. That is, let us assume that, when X < X I = X=2, shareholders would never tender for a price below (1 ')X=2. In principle, all shareholders tendering for a price b 2 (1 ')X; (1 ')X=2 is an equilibrium behavior (then, if the others tender and you do not, your payo¤ is (1 ')X < b, because the takeover occurs regardless of your decision). This equilibrium is sometimes called a 'panic equilibrium'. The 'no-panic-equilibria'assumption can be justi…ed on the grounds of Pareto-dominance (from the shareholders'perspective, the 'trust equilibrium', i.e., when nobody tenders, Pareto-dominates the 'panic equilibrium') or by the arbitrage argument (a friendly arbitrageur, who would leave control to the incumbent, could overbid the acquirer by b + " and make a pro…t).
The raider's payo¤ from acquiring all shares at price b is (1 ')X + 'X b = X b, and her payo¤ from acquiring just the incumbent's block at price p is [(1 ')X p] + 'X.
Lemma 1 Assume the bargaining has failed and consider the tender o¤ er stage. Then, the equilibrium of this subgame under symmetric information is as follows:
When X (1 ')X=2, the acquirer does not make a tender o¤ er When X 2 (1 ')X=2; X=2 , the acquirer bids b = (1 ')X=2, all shareholders (including the incumbent blockholder) tender their shares, the acquirer's payo¤ is X (1 ')X=2 > 0
, the acquirer bids b = (1 ')X, all shareholders (including the incumbent blockholder) tender their shares, the acquirer's payo¤ is 'X When X > X=2 + 'X 2(1 ') , the acquirer bids b = (1 ')X=2 + ('= )X=2, the incumbent blockholder tenders his shares, while other shareholders do not, the acquirer's payo¤ is
Proof. Since a small shareholder perceives himself pivotal with zero probability, then, if he expects the takeover to occur, he will not sell his share at a price below the security bene…ts the raider would generate (the free-rider problem due to Grossman and Hart, 1980) . Moreover, due to the 'no-panic-equilibria' assumption, dispersed shareholders will never sell at a price lower than the security bene…ts they receive under the incumbent's control. Thus, it cannot happen in equilibrium that the raider takes the …rm over and buys the shares of the dispersed shareholders at the price below max (1 ')X; (1 ')X=2 . In addition, if the incumbent is pivotal to the outcome of a tender o¤er, for given strategies of dispersed shareholders, he is not going to sell at a price below his valuation of his stake, i.e., below (1 ')X=2 + ('= )X=2:
With these arguments in mind, we can …rst conclude that for X < X=2 the minimum price at which the raider can acquire the company is (1 ')X=2. All shareholders tender their shares at this price (the incumbent, of course, is unhappy with the takeover, since he loses relative to the status quo, but he cannot a¤ect the outcome). The raider's payo¤ is then X (1 ')X=2, which is negative for X < (1 ')X=2 (and then the raider does not make a tender o¤er) and positive for X > (1 ')X=2 (and then the raider acquires the company at (1 ')X=2).
When X X=2, due to the free-rider problem, the minimum price at which the raider can attract the shares of the dispersed shareholders is (1 ')X. When this value is lower than the incumbent's valuation of his block,
(1 ')X is the minimum price at which the company can be acquired. Again, all shareholders tender, and the incumbent cannot a¤ect the outcome of the takeover. The raider obtains
2(1 ') ), the raider does not need to attract the dispersed shareholders'shares. Instead she can bid just the incumbent's valuation of his block: b = (1 ')X=2 + ('= )X=2. In the unique equilibrium, following this o¤er, the dispersed shareholders abstain, but the incumbent tenders. Indeed, given that the control is transferred, the dispersed shareholders are better o¤ retaining their shares, as the bid is lower than the security bene…ts they would receive under the raider's control. At the same time, the incumbent prefers to tender, because he is pivotal to the outcome of the takeover. 18 The raider's payo¤ is [(1 ')X b] + 'X. Bidding (1 ')X > (1 ')X=2 + ('= )X=2 in order to attract the shares of dispersed shareholders is clearly suboptimal, because the raider would not make any pro…t from purchasing their shares at this price, while paying more for the incumbent's block. Bidding below (1 ')X=2 + ('= )X=2 will result in the incumbent's refusal. Thus, whenever (1 ')X > (1 ')X=2 + ('= )X=2, b = (1 ')X=2 + ('= )X=2 is optimal, and the raider's payo¤ is [ (1 ') + '] X X=2 .
The key thing to notice in Lemma 1 is that, in situations when the raider acquires the whole company, apart from obtaining the private bene…t she never makes a pro…t on purchasing shares, and makes a loss when X 2 (1 ')X=2; X=2 . This is because the raider has to bid at least the security bene…ts she would generate, and even more when she is less e¢ cient than the incumbent, if she wants to convince the dispersed shareholders to sell.
, the raider simply obtains her private bene…ts 'X, and for X 2 (1 ')X=2; X=2 , she obtains X (1 ')X=2 < 'X. This observation suggests that the raider would like to avoid acquiring 100% of the company, at least in the zone where she pays more than the security bene…ts she will generate. The following lemma shows that indeed, in equilibrium the raider never prefers to let the game reach the tender o¤er stage, and for X 2 (1 ')X=2; X=2 the preference for a negotiated block trade is strict.
Lemma 2 The equilibrium in the full game under symmetric information is as follows:
When X (1 ')X=2, there is no transfer of control When X 2 (1 ')X=2; X=2 , there is a negotiated block trade at price p = (1 ')X=2, the acquirer's payo¤ is
, either a block trade at price p = (1 ')X or a tender o¤ er with bid b = (1 ')X occurs. In the case of a tender o¤ er, all shareholders tender their shares. The acquirer is indi¤ erent between the two scenarios and obtains 'X in either case.
, either a block trade at price p = (1 ')X=2 + ('= )X=2 or a tender o¤ er with bid b = (1 ')X=2 + ('= )X=2 occurs. In the case of a tender o¤ er, only the incumbent blockholder tenders his shares. The acquirer is indi¤ erent between the two scenarios and obtains [ (1 ') + '] X X=2 in either case.
Proof. When X (1 ')X=2, there is no tender o¤er following the negotiations failure. At the same time, there are no gains from a block trade for the incumbent and the raider, because the former is more e¢ cient. Hence, nothing happens in this case.
When X 2 (1 ')X=2; X=2 , the raider can take the …rm over by making a tender o¤er at price b = (1 ')X=2. If this happens, the raider will obtain X (1 ')X=2, as we know from Lemma 1. However, the raider overpays for the shares of dispersed shareholders: (1 ')X=2 is greater than (1 ')X, the security bene…ts she would generate. Thus, she would prefer to buy as few shares as possible at this price. Therefore, the raider proposes p = (1 ')X=2 to the incumbent, and the incumbent agrees (his outside option is to obtain the same in a tender o¤er). Proposing less would lead to the incumbent's refusal, and proposing more is clearly suboptimal. The acquirer obtains
, the raider neither gains nor loses on purchasing shares in a tender o¤er: she pays exactly the security bene…ts she is going to generate and receives only her private bene…ts 'X. Therefore, the raider cannot gain from a block trade. The minimum price she has to o¤er to the incumbent in order for the latter to agree is the same (1 ')X. If she o¤ers less, the incumbent will refuse as he understands that he will get (1 ')X in a tender o¤er. Thus, in a block trade the raider gets
, if the game reaches the tender o¤er stage, the raider acquires control with bid of just (1 ')X=2 + ('= )X=2, and the only shareholder who tenders to the raider is the incumbent. The raider could obviously o¤er the same (1 ')X=2 + ('= )X=2 at t = 0, the incumbent would agree (but would clearly reject any lower price), and the raider would obtain the same payo¤ as from the tender o¤er.
Notice that in the last zone, if the raider goes for a tender o¤er, it essentially results in a block trade anyway. This is because in this zone the incumbent is so much less e¢ cient than the raider that it becomes cheaper for the raider to bid the incumbent's valuation of his block than to attract the shares of dispersed shareholders. Thus, we have some sort of non-monotonicity with respect to X (ignoring the zone where control is not transferred at all): for small X a block trade occurs, for intermediate X the raider is indi¤erent between a block trade and a tender o¤er, and for high X again a block trade essentially occurs (even if as a result of a tender o¤er). We are not going to have this non-monotonicity in the asymmetric information model: all raiders with X above certain threshold will acquire 100% of the shares (unless the threshold completely disappears, in which case the only mode of control transfer will be block trades).
To summarize the solution under symmetric information, tender o¤ers are weakly dominated by block trades. Dispersed shareholder are never willing to sell at a price below the security bene…ts the raider would generate and sometimes "demand" even a higher price (when the incumbent is more e¢ cient than the raider). Therefore, given that the raider obtains control, she cannot make any pro…t from purchasing the dispersed shares and sometimes makes a loss. If we introduce a small cost of administering a tender o¤er (empirically such costs are pretty large, and should be larger than any administrative costs a negotiated block trade involve), tender o¤ers will be strictly dominated by block trades, meaning that we should never observe tender o¤ers. If we introduced a possibility of a tender o¤er contest between the acquirer and the incumbent, that would make the case for block trades even stronger, because the contest would only drive up the bid price (see Section 6) .
I will show now that under asymmetric information about X, for a wide range of parameters, high types of acquirers will strictly prefer to make a tender o¤er in equilibrium, while intermediate types will opt for a block trade (the lowest types will abstain from any transaction). Hence, I will rationalize the simultaneous existence of both types of corporate control transactions in …rms with a dominant minority blockholder.
Asymmetric information case
The analysis of the asymmetric information case has similarities to the analysis of tender o¤ers with bidder's private information by At, Burkart, and Lee (2011), but, in contrast to that paper, I have negotiations between the acquirer and the incumbent in the …rst stage of the game. This assumption rules out equilibria with tender o¤ers resulting in buying just the incumbent's share. The assumption does not a¤ect my results, but greatly simpli…es the analysis under asymmetric information.
In the subsequent text, when I say that the raider "makes a tender o¤er"("goes for a tender o¤er", "launches a bid", etc.) in equilibrium, I will mean that the raider …rst deliberately o¤ers a very low price to the incumbent, such that the latter rejects, and then makes a tender o¤er.
The following three lemmas are very helpful for the subsequent analysis.
Lemma 3 If an acquirer with some e X prefers a block trade at price p to doing nothing (abstaining), so do all acquirers with X > e X.
Proof. A block trade at price p is preferred to abstention whenever
Clearly, if this inequality holds for some e X, it also holds for all X > e X.
Lemma 4
If an acquirer with some e X prefers acquiring 100% of shares at price b to abstaining, so do all acquirers with X > e X.
Proof. Full acquisition at price b is preferred to abstention whenever X b > 0, or X > b. Clearly, if this inequality holds for some e X, it also holds for all X > e X.
Lemma 5 If an acquirer with some e X prefers acquiring 100% of shares at price b to a block trade at price p, so do all acquirers with X > e X.
Proof. Acquisition at price b is preferred to a block trade at price p whenever
. Clearly, if this inequality holds for some e X, it also holds for all X > e X. Before we proceed, let us establish that there exists no equilibrium in which some types of raiders acquire only the incumbent's stake as a result of a tender o¤er. This result will allow us to unambiguously identify a successful tender o¤er with the acquisition of 100% of the shares, and an acquisition of the incumbent's block -with a negotiated block trade.
Lemma 6 Given Assumption 4, there exists no equilibrium in which some types of raiders acquire only the incumbent's block in a tender o¤ er
Proof. See the Appendix. Now, let us make the following important observations. If some types of acquirers do a block trade in equilibrium, they all do it at the same price. Otherwise, a type who buys the block at a price higher than another type would clearly deviate and o¤er the lower price. Second, the equilibrium bid must also be the same for all types who acquire the whole company for the same reason. Let us denote the equilibrium block trade price and bid (per unit share) by p and b respectively.
These observations together with Lemmas 3 to 6 imply a very simple equilibrium structure. Speci…cally, any equilibrium is characterized by maximum two thresholds, X 0 and X 00 , such that: types with X X 0 do not acquire control, types with X 2 (X 0 ; X 00 ] purchase the incumbent's block in a privately negotiated deal, and types with X > X 00 acquire the whole company through a tender o¤er. Note that the existence of all three zones is not guaranteed. Depending on the parameters, there can potentially be equilibria without block trades as well as equilibria without tender o¤ers by any type. However, the ordering of segments is unique: that is, it cannot be that a type who does a block trade has a higher X than someone who goes for a tender o¤er, or that an abstainer has a higher type than someone who acquires control.
It is rather obvious that an equilibrium with all types abstaining does not exist, for the acquirer with X = X could always launch a tender o¤er with bid (1 ')X and earn the pro…t 'X (such an o¤er would be accepted by the dispersed shareholders regardless of their beliefs).
It is also straightforward that the zone with abstainers must exist in equilibrium. If it did not, that would mean that even the type with X = 0 acquires the …rm at a positive price, which would be clearly suboptimal. 19 Thus, there remain three potential types of equilibria to consider:
all types with X 2 [0; X BT ] abstain from any transaction, and all types with X 2 X BT ; X do a block trade;
all types with X 2 [0; X T O ] abstain from any transaction, and all types with X 2 X T O ; X acquire the …rm in a tender o¤er;
all types with X 2 [0; X 0 ] abstain from any transaction, all types with X 2 (X 0 ; X 00 ] do a block trade, and all types with X 2 X 00 ; X acquire the …rm in a tender o¤er.
For given values of the parameters, there is generally a continuum of equilibria due to the fact that the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium concept does not pin down out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Common re…nements, such as the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion or D1 or D2 criteria do not help to reduce the set of equilibria. While the multiplicity of equilibria in this model is not a problem for rationalizing the existence of tender o¤ers, it makes di¢ cult to make predictions about stock price reactions to takeover announcements as well as derive e¢ ciency implications of the model. In order to cope with this problem, I apply the concept of "credible beliefs" due to Grossman and Perry (1986) . In the context of takeovers, this concept was used in Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and At, Burkart, and Lee (2011). 20 Let us start from the last, "richest", case.
Lemma 7 An equilibrium satisfying the credible beliefs criterion of Grossman and Perry (1986) with X 0 2 (0; X) and X 00 2 (X 0 ; X), such that all types with X 2 [0; X 0 ] abstain from any transaction, all types with X 2 (X 0 ; X 00 ] do a block trade, and all types with X 2 X 00 ; X acquire 100% of shares in a tender o¤ er, exists if and only if ' 2 ( =(1+ ); 1). The equilibrium of this type is unique for all ' 2 ( =(1 + ); 1), and in this equilibrium
Proof. See the Appendix. The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1 . In this equilibrium a raider is faced with the following trade-o¤: acquiring 100% of shares at a lower price, b , versus buying relatively few shares (stake ) at a higher price, p . In both cases, the raider obtains the private bene…ts. However, her payo¤ is more sensitive to her type when the takeover occurs through a tender o¤er as opposed to a block trade, precisely because she acquires more shares in a tender o¤er.
Thus, higher types gain relatively more (or lose relatively less) from a tender o¤er compared to a block trade. As a result, the types who acquire control sort into those who do it through a block trade (X 2 (X 0 ; X 00 ]) and those who launch a tender o¤er (X 2 X 00 ; X ). More formally, types from X 00 ; X …rst o¤er some price below p to the incumbent, get rejected, and then launch a tender o¤er. The lowest types (X 2 [0; X 0 ]) prefer to abstain from any transaction.
Similarly to the symmetric information model, the equilibrium bid equals the expected posttakeover security bene…ts: b = (1 ')(X 00 + X)=2. Notice that under asymmetric information there also exist equilibria where b > (1 ')(X 00 + X)=2. These equilibria rely on the outof-equilibrium belief that the security bene…ts generated by a raider bidding b < b are below b: E((1 ')X j b) < b: We follow Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and At et al (2011) in selecting the minimum bid equilibrium, which is the unique equilibrium satisfying the credible beliefs criterion of Grossman and Perry (1986) . In such equilibrium b = (1 ') X 00 + X =2, and any price below this value is rejected.
Block trade
Tender offer X/2 Figure 1 . Equilibrium with block trades and tender o¤ers.
The raider with X = b X 2 (X 0 ; X 00 ) (see Figure 1) is indi¤erent between bidding b and abstaining. If the incumbent rejects the equilibrium o¤er p , types (X 0 ; b X] abstain, whereas types ( b X; X 00 ] launch a bid. Since, in equilibrium, any bid below b is rejected, the latter types have to bid b . Notice that in our equilibrium b < p < (1 ')
The wedge between p and b and the mere coexistence of block trades and tender o¤ers in equilibrium is due to the asymmetry of information. As we have seen from Lemma 2, under symmetric information, a raider who is ready to launch a tender o¤er at price b could always bring her private o¤er p down to b, or, equivalently, keep the incumbent just at his disagreement payo¤. Under asymmetric information, the disagreement payo¤ of the incumbent is private information of the raider, because only the raider knows whether she is going to abstain or launch a tender o¤er if rejected by the incumbent. Types who would launch a tender o¤er (relatively high types) would like to communicate that to the incumbent in order to convince him to sell at a lower price. However, they cannot credibly do it, because the type is soft information. As a result, among the types who do a block trade, higher types pay "too much"for the block (they would pay less if they could credibly reveal their type to the incumbent), whereas lower types pay "too little" (they would have to pay more if the incumbent knew their type). As a result, very high types (X > X 00 ) are not willing to buy the block at all and prefer to acquire 100% at a lower price per share.
Notice that the incumbent agrees to sell the block at a price below his valuation of the block. This is precisely because he is not sure what is going to happen if he rejects: with a positive probability a tender o¤er will follow, and then he will get an even lower price. In fact, in the equilibrium of Lemma 7 the incumbent is just indi¤erent between accepting price p and rejecting it. 21 Let us turn now to the second potential type of equilibrium, the one in which all types with X 2 [0; X T O ] abstain, and all types with X 2 X T O ; X acquire the …rm in a tender o¤er. It turns out that such an equilibrium does not exist.
Lemma 8 For any value of ', there exists no equilibrium satisfying the credible beliefs criterion in which no type does a block trade:
Proof. See the Appendix.
It should be noted that, if we do not impose the requirement of credible beliefs, an equilibrium without block trades actually exists for all ' > 1=3. However, it is supported by the non-credible (in the sense of Grossman and Perry (1986)) belief that a raider who wants to pro…t by deviating to a block trade is of such a low type in expectation that she will most likely abstain if the incumbent rejects (see the Appendix for details).
Finally, let us consider the …rst type of equilibrium, the one in which all types with X 2 [0; X BT ] abstain from any transaction, and all types with X 2 X BT ; X do a block trade.
Lemma 9
An equilibrium in which all types with X 2 [0; X BT ] abstain from any transaction, and all types with X 2 X BT ; X do a block trade exists if and only if ' 2 (0; =(1 + )]. The equilibrium of this type is unique for all ' 2 (0; =(1 + )]. In this equilibrium X BT = X=2 and p = (1 ') X 2 + ' X 2 , and the credible beliefs criterion is satis…ed.
Thus, in this equilibrium the acquirer pays exactly the incumbent's valuation of his block in a block trade. Naturally, at this price the transaction occurs if and only if the acquirer is more e¢ cient than the raider, i.e., whenever X > X=2.
As follows from Lemmas 7 to 9, for any constellation of the parameters, there exists a unique equilibrium 22 , satisfying the credible beliefs criterion. With this in mind, I can now fully characterize the equilibria for all values of the parameters.
Proposition 1 The unique equilibrium satisfying the credible beliefs criterion is as follows:
For ' 2 (0; =(1 + )] all types with X 2 0; X=2 abstain from any transaction, and all types with X 2 X=2; X do a block trade at price p = (1 ') X 2 + ' X 2 .
For ' 2 ( =(1 + ); 1) all types with X 2 [0; X 0 ] abstain from any transaction, all types with X 2 (X 0 ; X 00 ] do a block trade, and all types with X 2 X 00 ; X acquire the …rm in a tender o¤ er, with
The "switch"from one type of equilibrium to the other type at ' = =(1+ ) is continuous, that is, at ' = =(1 + ) X 0 = X=2, X 00 = X, and
Notice that our equilibrium exhibits continuity with respect to the parameters even at ' = =(1 + ). Once we approach this point by decreasing ', tender o¤ers gradually disappear, and the set of types who do a block trade as well as the price of the block converge to the set of block purchasers and the block price for ' 2 (0; =(1 + )]. As ' decreases, set X 00 ; X shrinks, essentially because tender o¤ers become less attractive due to a greater price the bidder has to pay in a tender o¤er. There are several e¤ects simultaneously at play. Since the security bene…ts the bidder generates are decreasing in ', lowering ' pushes the tender o¤er price up (both due to higher security bene…ts for given X and due to an increase in the average quality of bidders). At the same time, the incumbent's valuation of his block, (1 ') X 2 + ' X 2 decreases as ' falls, because it is more sensitive to private bene…ts than to security bene…ts. The …rst e¤ect exerts an upward pressure on the block trade price (a higher bid increases the incumbent's expected disagreement payo¤), whereas the second e¤ect exerts a downward pressure on it (a lower value of the block for the incumbent decreases his disagreement payo¤). As a result the block trade price does not increase as much as the tender o¤er bid and even may decrease. 23 Therefore, the relative attractiveness of a tender o¤er compared to a block trade decreases, and the set of types who make a tender o¤er shrinks. Eventually, when ' becomes too small, even the highest type prefers to switch to a block trade. At ' = =(1 + ) the highest type is just indi¤erent between acquiring 100% of shares at (1 ')X and buying the incumbent's stake at
In fact, the two prices are equal at this point. It is rather intuitive that a further decrease in ' will make the highest type strictly prefer a block trade.
The main contribution of this section is that it rationalizes the simultaneous existence of tender o¤ers and block trades in …rms with a dominant minority blockholder. When either legal shareholder protection is bad enough (high ') or the incumbent's stake is low enough, tender o¤ers appear in equilibrium. The model produces several interesting implications, which I am going to discuss now.
Model implications
The model yields implications for:
-the stock price reactions to the announcements of block trades and tender o¤ers, -the size of the takeover premium in tender o¤ers (since all tender o¤ers are successful, the takeover premium is equal to the stock price reaction to the tender o¤er),
-the e¢ ciency of takeovers and the e¤ects of the mandatory bid rule.
For all types of implications, I will concentrate on the e¤ects of the quality of legal shareholder protection, that is, parameter '. Before moving to the e¤ects of shareholder protection let us formulate one result that follows immediately from the analysis.
Announcement stock price reaction: block trades versus tender o¤ers
Proposition 2 For a given incumbent blockholder's share, the stock price reaction to a tender o¤ er is higher than to an announcement of a block trade.
This result follows immediately from the equilibrium structure: tender o¤ers are simply made by better acquirers. Once a block trade is announced, the stock price becomes (1 ') (X 0 + X 00 ) =2, while a tender o¤er raises the stock price to (1 ') X 00 + X =2. This result explains the empirical evidence: indeed targets'stock prices react to tender o¤ers more positively than to block trade announcements. For example, Barclay and Holderness (1991) report a substantial di¤erence in cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date between those deals that resulted in full acquisitions and those in which a block trade was the ultimate control transaction. Similarly, Holmén and Nivorozhkin (2012) report a large di¤erence between announcement returns in non-partial tender o¤ers and block trades. In both papers, acquisition of 100% of shares is associated with higher abnormal returns. Although other empirical studies do not directly compare block trades and tender o¤ers, a rough indirect comparison 24 can be made by looking at these papers separately. Martynova 
E¢ ciency of takeovers and the e¤ects of the mandatory bid rule
From Proposition 1 it immediately follows that, for ' 2 ( =(1 + ); 1), both X 0 and X 00 increase with an improvement in shareholder protection, i.e., as ' falls. As ' reaches =(1 + ) from above, a further improvement in legal protection does not change the set of types who take the company over. Hence, the following proposition is true.
Proposition 3 For a given incumbent blockholder's share, when shareholder protection is stronger, takeovers both via block trades and via tender o¤ ers are implemented by higher quality acquirers. When shareholder protection is not strong enough (i.e., ' > =(1 + )), all e¢ cient takeovers occur, but some ine¢ cient takeovers occur as well. When shareholder protection becomes suf…ciently strong, (i.e., ' 2 (0; =(1 + )]), the …rst-best (i.e., a transfer of control occurring if and only if X X=2) is achieved. Overall, shareholder protection increases (weakly) the e¢ ciency of takeovers of targets with a dominant minority shareholder.
Since, with an increase in shareholder protection, private bene…ts diminish relative to security bene…ts, only good enough acquirers …nd it pro…table to make a takeover when the law protects small shareholders well. Thus, as legal protection improves, the average quality of raiders that actually acquire control increases.
Notice that this e¤ect is driven by the presence of types who acquire the …rm through a tender o¤er (unless ' 2 (0; =(1 + )], in which case tender o¤ers do not take place). Without the possibility of a tender o¤er, all control transfers would be block trades at the price equal to the incumbent's valuation of his block, (1 ')
2 , and they would occur if and only if X > X=2 (just like for ' 2 (0; =(1 + )] in our equilibrium). Then, ' would have no e¤ect on the average quality of acquirers ever. With the possibility of tender o¤ers, the increase in the equilibrium bid price due to a decrease in ' puts upward pressure on p , so that it does not decrease as strongly as (1 ')
2 and may even increase as ' falls (see the brief discussion right after Proposition 1). As a result, the threshold on X above which block trades occur increases rather than remains …xed, and the average quality of all types who acquire control goes up.
Notice also that the possibility of acquiring control through a block trade ensures that e¢ cient control transfers always take place. In the absence of the mandatory bid rule the acquirer can always purchase only the incumbent's block if she wishes. Since the block price does not exceed the incumbent's valuation of the block, a block trade always yields a positive payo¤ to the raider when she values the block more than the incumbent, which is equivalent to the acquirer being more e¢ cient than the incumbent in the model. Along the lines of At, Burkart, and Lee (2011), one can easily show that without the possibility of block trades, a too strong shareholder protection would kill some e¢ cient takeovers in my setup. Thus, an important caveat is that the e¢ ciency implications of shareholder protection in my model are con…ned to …rms with a large non-controlling shareholder.
Proposition 3 also implies that takeovers become less likely as shareholder protection improves. This may sound at odds with the common observations that takeovers, and especially tender o¤ers, are more widespread in countries with better shareholder protection. However, it is important to keep in mind that the proposition is formulated for given , while …rms from countries with weaker legal environments normally have more concentrated ownership structures. If we increase ' and jointly, the direction of a change in X 0 and X 00 is ambiguous, because both thresholds increase with . It is equally ambiguous how the condition ' =(1 + ) is a¤ected. Moreover, if reaches 50%, which is not rare in weak legal environments, making a takeover without the consent of the incumbent blockholder is simply impossible (if > 50%, only block trades can occur, and they will whenever X > X=2, that is, not more often than in countries with strong shareholder protection in our model).
The result that the market for corporate control is more e¢ cient in countries with better legal protection of investors is also obtained in Burkart et al (2012) . However, in their model the rationale for such a result is totally di¤erent. In Burkart et al (2012) , stronger investor protection increases the pledgeable income of the bidder, thereby reducing the role of internal funds in …nancing a takeover. As a result, as investor protection improves, bidder's e¢ ciency as opposed to availability of internal funds becomes more important in determining the winner in a takeover contest.
Let us now consider the e¤ect of the mandatory bid rule. The rule is immaterial in my setup if the threshold for a mandatory bid is above . Thus, let us assume that the threshold is below , so that acquiring the incumbent's stake triggers a mandatory bid to the remaining shareholders at the price of the block trade.
With the mandatory bid rule, there can be three possible types of equilibria. In an equilibrium of the …rst type, all types below certain X T O abstain, while all types above X T O acquire the entire company at price b
(1 ')
In an equilibrium of the second type, all types below certain X BT abstain, while all types above X BT purchase only the incumbent's share at p = (1 ')
In an equilibrium of the third type, all types below certain e X abstain, while all types above e X purchase the incumbent's share at p = (1 ')
2 and some share of the dispersed equity.
In the …rst type of equilibrium, b cannot be above the incumbent's valuation of the block,
If it were, there would be bidders with (1 ')X < b, who would pro…t by deviating and o¤ering (1 ')
2 (the incumbent would agree to sell at this price). In the second type of equilibrium, the dispersed shareholders do not tender for p = (1 ')
2 . In the third type of equilibrium, the dispersed shareholders are indi¤erent between tendering and not because they believe that E
2 . However, in contrast to the setup without the MBR, now "not tendering"is not a weakly dominated strategy for a small shareholder, because at the moment of his tendering decision the transfer of control has already occurred through a block trade, and, hence, the shareholder's payo¤ does not depend on strategies of other small shareholders.
There cannot be equilibria in which, among those types who acquire control, some types just purchase a block at p, while other types acquire the whole company at b. Imagine such an equilibrium exists. Then, …rst, it must be that p > b, otherwise some of the types who acquire the whole company would gain from purchasing the block at p instead. Second, it must be that the dispersed shareholders reject the mandatory o¤er at price p. Furthermore, as we know from Lemma 5, all types who acquire 100% must have higher X that any of the types who just buy the block. But then, given that the dispersed shareholders tender at price b, they would not reject a mandatory o¤er at price p, since this price should exceed the expected security bene…ts generated by a type who o¤ers p. Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 11
Under the mandatory bid rule, an equilibrium, in which all types with X 2 [0; X BT ] abstain, and all types with X 2 X BT ; X purchase only the incumbent's share, exists if and only if ' =(2 + ) ' BT . The equilibrium of this type is unique for all ' ' BT . In this equilibrium X BT = X=2, and p = (1 ') X 2 + ' X 2 , and the credible beliefs criterion is satis…ed. Moreover, ' BT < ' T O from Lemma 10.
Lemma 12
Under the mandatory bid rule, an equilibrium, satisfying the credible beliefs criterion, in which all types with X 2 h 0; e X( ) i abstain, and all types with X 2 e X( ); X i purchase share 2 ( ; 1), including the entire incumbent's stake, exists if and only if ' = e '( ), where e '( ) is a continuous strictly increasing function, taking value ' BT from Lemma 11 at = and ' T O from Lemma 10 at = 1. The equilibrium of this type is unique for any ' 2 (' BT ; ' T O ). Threshold e X( ) is a continuous strictly increasing function that takes values X BT and X T O from Lemmas 11 and 10 at = and = 1 respectively, and p = (1 ')
It follows from Lemma 12 that for any ' 2 (' BT ; ' T O ) there exist a unique equilibrium, in which the share acquired by the raider is a strictly increasing continuous function of ':
(') = e ' 1 ('). Correspondingly, the threshold e X( ) can also be represented as a strictly increasing continuous function of ': e X(') = e X( (')). Let us summarize the results of Lemmas 10-12. When ' < ' BT , a transfer of control occurs whenever X > X=2. When ' 2 (' BT ; ' T O ), the transfer of control occurs whenever X > e X('), where e X(') is a continuous strictly increasing function with e X(' BT ) = X=2 and e X('
Now we can compare e¢ ciency of control transfers with and without the MBR. First, notice that X T O > X 0 for any ' 2 (0; 1). Second, X T O > X=2 whenever ' < 1=3. There are …ve distinct zones, depicted in Figure 2 . When legal protection is very bad, i.e., when ' > 1=3, the MBR unambiguously raises e¢ ciency, as the set of types who acquire control shrinks from X 0 ; X to X T O ; X with X T O < X=2, that is, we only lose ine¢ cient takeovers. Figure 2 . Mandatory bid rule and e¢ ciency.
MBR is good
When shareholder protection becomes better, ' 2 ( =(1 + ); 1=3), the MBR kills also some e¢ cient control transfers, as X T O > X=2 in this zone. This negative e¤ect is due to the fact that for ' > ' BT the MBR kills block trades. Without the possibility of acquiring control through a block trade, the asymmetry of information makes types that are not high enough overpay for 100% of the shares. As a result, when private bene…ts are not su¢ ciently high (' < 1=3), even for some of the raiders who are more e¢ cient than the incumbent a takeover through a tender o¤er becomes unpro…table. Thus, for ' 2 ( =(1 + ); 1=3), the impact of the MBR on e¢ ciency is generally ambiguous. However, it is clear that the "net"e¤ect of the MBR gradually changes from positive to negative as ' falls. Since X T O grows with a decrease in ', more and more e¢ cient raiders abstain from a takeover after the introduction of the MBR. At the same time, the positive e¤ect (prevention of ine¢ cient takeovers) diminishes, because fewer takeovers remain ine¢ cient without the MBR.
For ' 2 (' T O ; =(1 + )) the MBR is unambiguously bad for e¢ ciency. In this zone, without the MBR a takeover takes place if and only if it is e¢ cient, while with the MBR some e¢ cient control transfers do not occur, as X T O > X=2.
When ' 2 (' BT ; ' T O ) the e¤ect of the MBR continues to be unambiguously negative, but the e¢ ciency loss diminishes as ' decreases, because e X(') is an increasing function (i.e., more takeovers occur as ' falls). This is because now the raider does not have to acquire 100% of the company, and, hence, is to a lesser extent a¤ected by the information asymmetry. Moreover, falls with a decline of ', so the e¤ect of information asymmetry diminishes further, and more and more types can a¤ord a takeover.
Finally, when ' 2 (0; ' BT ), the MBR does not prevent pure block trades, because the price of the block becomes so low that small shareholders are not willing to tender their shares in response to a mandatory bid. Hence, in this zone the MBR is irrelevant for e¢ ciency. The above analysis can be summarized in the following proposition Proposition 4 For …rms with a dominant minority shareholder, the positive e¤ ect (preventing ine¢ cient takeovers) of the mandatory bid rule on takeover e¢ ciency prevails over the negative e¤ ect (impeding e¢ cient takeovers) when shareholder protection is su¢ ciently weak. However, when shareholder protection becomes strong enough, but not too strong, the negative e¤ ect of the mandatory bid rule prevails. When shareholder protection is very strong, the rule is irrelevant. Hence, whereas the mandatory bid rule promotes takeover e¢ ciency under weak shareholder protection, it does not promote and can be detrimental for takeover e¢ ciency when shareholder protection is strong.
Stock price reaction and takeover premium: e¤ects of shareholder protection
Proposition 2 has already established one implication for stock price reactions to block trades and tender o¤ers. In order to derive the e¤ect of shareholder protection on the announcement returns, it is necessary to make assumptions about the pre-announcement market expectations. I will consider the two polar cases: one in which the deal is totally unanticipated by the market and one in which the market is fully aware that the acquirer with X distributed uniformly on 0; X is already "around". 25 Notice that in our model there is no di¤erence between the takeover premium and the stock price reaction in the case of a tender o¤er, because the acquirer pays the expected post-takeover security bene…ts and all tender o¤ers succeed with certainty in equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Regardless of whether the deal is totally unanticipated or not, for a given incumbent blockholder's share: the target's stock price reaction to a tender o¤ er and the takeover premium are higher in countries with stronger shareholder protection, the target's stock price reaction to a block trade announcement is higher in countries with stronger shareholder protection.
Then, using the expressions for X 0 and X 00 , in the case of a tender o¤er
is below 1. Then, q=q 0 is increasing in y, and, hence, decreasing in '. Similarly, in the case of a block trade for ' 2 ( =(1 + ); 1) one can derive q=q 0 = 3y 2 + y (1=2)y 2 , which is increasing in y, and, hence, decreasing in '.
When ' =(1+ ) only block trades occur and they occur whenever X > X=2 regardless of '; hence the stock price reaction is insensitive to shareholder protection in this zone, regardless of whether the deal is totally unanticipated or not. Rossi and Volpin (2004) have found that takeover premiums are higher in countries with better legal protection of shareholders. They suggested two potential explanations. First, better investor protection lowers the cost of capital and, therefore, leads to more competition between bidders, which drives up the premium. Second, countries with stronger shareholder protection have more dispersed ownership, which results in a greater free-rider problem among target shareholders and, hence, a higher bid price.
My model provides an alternative explanation for this …nding. The basic intuition behind Proposition 5 stems from the result that in better legal regimes both tender o¤ers and block trades are implemented by better quality acquirers on average. Hence, in the "fully unexpected deal"scenario, the stock price reaction to both tender o¤ers and block trades is trivially higher in better legal regimes. In the "partially expected deal"scenario the logic is a bit more complicated, because the pre-announcement price incorporates the change in the pool of successful acquirers due to improved shareholder protection. However, the e¤ect of the change in the average quality of acquirers on the post-announcement price is naturally stronger, so the ultimate e¤ect of shareholder protection on the stock price reaction remains positive.
It should be noted that Proposition 5 is about within-country takeovers rather than crossboarder deals. When studying the announcement target's returns, Rossi and Volpin (2004) do not distinguish between cross-boarder and domestic takeovers. They, however, …nd no e¤ect of the di¤erence between the acquirer and target countries'shareholder protection on the announcement returns. Bris and Cabolis (2008) do not …nd any statistically signi…cant e¤ect of the target country's shareholder protection, but their empirical speci…cations do not allow to estimate the e¤ect of shareholder protection for domestic deals separately from cross-boarder deals. Instead, their study focuses on the e¤ects of the di¤erence in shareholder protection between the acquirer's and target's countries. 26 Cross-country research on wealth e¤ects of block trades is much scarcer. Liao (2010) …nds no statistically signi…cant e¤ect of shareholder protection on stock price reaction to block trades, but, again, the study does not estimate the e¤ect of the target country's legal institutions for domestic deals separately. 27 Thus, additional empirical research is needed to test Proposition 5.
Robustness
In this section I consider two modi…cations of the model. The …rst one allows for a counter o¤er by the incumbent. The second considers what happens if security bene…ts and private bene…ts are not positively correlated. I show that my results are reasonably robust to these modi…cations. In particular, the possibility of a counter o¤er does not change the results of the model in any way (but would change them somewhat if I assumed that X I > X=2), and the qualitative results of the model remain intact if private bene…ts are independent of security bene…ts (and even if they are negatively correlated, provided that private bene…ts are not too "sensitive" to security bene…ts).
Countering by the incumbent
Assume that at t = 2, after observing the raider's bid, the incumbent can launch a counter-bid. The dispersed shareholders then decide to whom to tender their shares (not tendering at all remains an option, of course). Let us assume that when dispersed shareholders are indi¤erent between tendering to the raider and tendering to the incumbent, they tender to the raider.
The possibility of a bid contest increases the price the raider has to pay in order to gain control. In the symmetric information case, this will lead both to a greater likelihood that a block trade is strictly preferred to a tender o¤er and to a lower likelihood of a control transfer. To see this, assume the dispersed shareholders would tender at price b to the raider if the incumbent does not overbid. The incumbent will decide to overbid (and acquire 1 shares) rather than sell to the raider whenever
Hence, in order to succeed in a tender o¤er, the raider will have to bid at least X=2.
It can be shown that the threat of countering will modify Lemma 1 in the following way. For X 2 (1 ')X=2; X=2 the raider will abstain from the contest, because the necessity to bid X=2 instead of (1 ') X=2 will result in a negative payo¤. For X 2 X=2;
the raider will launch a bid, but, having to bid X=2 instead of (1 ')X, she will obtain a lower payo¤ compared to Section 3. These changes, in turn, lead to the following changes in Lemma 2: for X 2 (1 ')X=2; X=2 there will be no transfer of control at all, and for X 2 X=2; X 2(1 ') i the raider, rather than being indi¤erent as in the baseline model, now strictly prefers a block trade, because in a tender o¤er she would have to pay more than the security bene…ts she would generate.
Consider now the case of asymmetric information. Whenever b from Section 4 exceeds X=2, the possibility of counterbidding does not change anything, because the incumbent would stay passive. Using the expression for b , condition b > X=2 becomes
It can be easily shown that this condition holds for all ' < 1. Thus, adding the possibility of counterbidding to our setup does not lead to e¤ective competition for the target under asymmetric information, and all the results of the model remain intact.
One of the implications of this subsection is that bid competition is less e¤ective under asymmetric information about the raider's ability, provided that the incumbent's ability is not too high relative to the distribution of the raider's one. This conclusion would also hold in a model without the possibility of block trades (like the one of At, Burkart, and Lee, 2011). The thing is that for low enough types, who would have to compete with the incumbent if their type were common knowledge, the asymmetry of information already raises the bid they have to o¤er above the security bene…ts they can create. If the incumbent's value is not too high, this bid increase simply deters competition. Essentially, instead of competing with the incumbent, low types of raiders have now to "compete" with the information asymmetry.
If we modify the model by assuming that the incumbent creates value X I > X=2, e¤ective competition would arise for large enough ', let us call this threshold ' EC . For ' < ' EC the solution would be similar to the solution of Section 4, while for ' > ' EC the raider would have to bid X I regardless of '. However, the tender o¤er zone would arguably still exist, though its size would be likely to diminish with respect to the no-competition model, since the raider would have to o¤er a higher bid.
No positive correlation between security bene…ts and private bene…ts
In the basic model, security bene…ts (1 ')X and private bene…ts 'X are perfectly positively correlated. This corresponds to the situation when all raiders have the same propensity to steal value but di¤erent ability to generate value. An alternative assumption would be that raiders di¤er in their propensity to steal, while having the same ability to generate value. This would yield a negative correlation between security bene…ts and private bene…ts. Below I examine the intermediate case, in which private bene…ts are independent of security bene…ts and argue that the qualitative results of the model do not change. After that I brie ‡y discuss the case of negative correlation and argue that when private bene…ts are not too sensitive to security bene…ts, the equilibrium with tender o¤ers should survive.
Imagine that X is not the whole value but just security bene…ts, distributed uniformly on [0; X]. Imagine also that private bene…ts are deterministic 28 and the same for all types of raiders and the incumbent. I denote their value by B. As in the basic model, assume that X I = X=2. Finally, assume that B X=2. 29 The crucial thing to notice is that in this modi…ed model the raider's payo¤s from both a block trade and a tender o¤er are increasing linear functions of X, with the tender o¤er payo¤ being a steeper function, just like in the baseline model. Indeed, the raider's payo¤ from a block trade is (X p) + B, whereas her payo¤ from acquiring 100% of shares is X + B b. Intuitively, this will give rise to the same equilibrium structure as in the baseline model. Just as in the baseline model, one can construct an equilibrium with thresholds X 0 and X 0030 , in which types with with X 2 [0; X 0 ] abstain from any transaction, types with X 2 (X 0 ; X 00 ] purchase the block, and types with X 2 X 00 ; X acquire the entire company by means of a tender o¤er. In fact one could simply look at Figure 1 for the illustration of the equilibrium (just the payo¤ expressions have to be changed). The equilibrium bid b will be equal to (X 00 + X)=2. Just as in Section 4, it will be smaller than the equilibrium block trade price p , which, in turn, will be lower than the incumbent's valuation (per unit share) of his block, X=2 + B= . If the incumbent rejects p , raiders from X 0 ; b X i would abstain, while types from b X; X 00 i would launch a tender o¤er at b . Price p will make the incumbent just indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the private o¤er.
One can show that such an equilibrium will exist whenever B 2 X=2; X=2 , and that this equilibrium will be the only equilibrium in this zone, satisfying the credible beliefs criterion. Just as it was in Section 4 for low enough private bene…ts, for B < X=2 the only equilibrium will be the one in which types with X 2 0; X=2 abstain, and types with X 2 X=2; X purchase the incumbent's block at the price equal to the incumbent's valuation of the block. Furthermore, the change from one type of equilibrium to the other will be continuous at B = X=2. The stock price and e¢ ciency implications will be the same as those of the baseline model. Since tender o¤ers are made by higher quality acquirers, they will produce a higher price jump compared with block trades. An increase in shareholder protection can be modelled via a decrease in B. 31 One can then show that lowering B moves both X 0 and X 00 to the right until, at B = X=2, X 0 becomes X=2. So, the e¤ects of shareholder protection on e¢ ciency, takeover premium and the stock price reactions will be the same as in Section 5. Now let us introduce a negative correlation between private bene…ts and security bene…ts. Speci…cally, assume that rather than being …xed, private bene…ts equal B X, where X is security bene…ts as before, and measures "sensitivity" of private bene…ts to security bene…ts (the correlation is 1, of course). In particular, = 0 corresponds to the just discussed case, where private bene…ts were …xed at B. It is almost obvious that for small enough , the conclusions of the model should not qualitatively change with respect to the case of …xed private bene…ts (by continuity).
However, if is large enough, equilibria with tender o¤ers may disappear completely. To illustrate this, assume = 1. Then, the raider's payo¤ from a block trade is (X p)+B X = (1 )X +B p, and her payo¤ from acquiring the whole company is X +B X b = B b. Look at Figure 3 . The block trade payo¤ is now downward sloping, while the tender o¤er payo¤ is just a horizontal line. That means if we want to have tender o¤ers, the former line has to lie above zero. But then there will be no abstainers if the incumbent rejects the private deal. This means that, in an equilibrium with both block trades and tender o¤ers, the block price has to be equal to the tender o¤er bid, p = b . Indeed, any p < b will be rejected by the incumbent, whereas any p > b is suboptimal for the raider. But then, in order for the raider with X = X 00 to be indi¤erent between the tender o¤er and the block trade it must be that B b = (1 )X 00 + B ab ;
However, this is impossible since it must be that b X 00 + X =2. Equilibria with tender o¤ers by all types are equally impossible. For any b, a type with low enough X could o¤er p slightly higher than b (which would clearly be accepted by the incumbent) and gain: 
Conclusion
I have developed a model that rationalizes the existence of both block trades and tender o¤ers in equilibrium in …rms with a dominant minority blockholder. Thus, in contrast to the previous literature, the model explains why we observe both types of control transfers in such companies. The paper suggests that the choice between a block trade and a tender o¤er is a¤ected by the acquirer's ability to generate value in the target …rm: among those types who acquire control, higher ability acquirers launch a tender o¤er and lower ability ones negotiate a block trade with the incumbent blockholder. The model provides a number of implications. First, the paper o¤ers a simple explanation for an empirically observed higher announcement returns of targets in tender o¤er deals as compared to negotiated block trades. Second, the model predicts higher takeover premiums and targets' announcement returns in both domestic tender o¤ers and domestic block trades in countries with better shareholder protection. While my result on takeover premiums is consistent with the empirical …ndings of Rossi and Volpin (2004) , further empirical research is needed to test my predictions. The model also obtains that stronger shareholder protection improves the e¢ ciency of control transfers. A similar result is obtained in Burkart et al (2012) , but their rationale is totally di¤erent from mine. Finally, I provide an argument against the mandatory bid rule in strong legal regimes. While raising the e¢ ciency of takeovers through preventing ine¢ cient takeovers under weak shareholder protection, the mandatory bid rule can harm takeover e¢ ciency under strong shareholder protection through impeding e¢ cient takeovers. A caveat is that the e¢ ciency implications of my model are con…ned to …rms with a large minority shareholder, in which control can be transferred by means of a block trade. A general direction for future research is to continue exploring how various types of information asymmetry can a¤ect the mode of the control transfer. In particular, the incumbent blockholder may also possess some private information about the value of the target's assets, especially in innovative …rms where a …rm's insiders (including large shareholders) have naturally better knowledge about potential success of the …rm's R&D projects. Another interesting task would be to explain the choice between friendly and hostile takeovers in …rms with dispersed ownership. Similarly to the present model, hostile takeovers may arise there due to bargaining imperfections caused by information asymmetries, but bargaining in such …rms is usually between a potential acquirer and the target's board of directors. In this respect, the role of public and private communication between the potential acquirer, the target's management, board of directors and shareholders is potentially very important and worth studying.
Due to the free-rider problem of dispersed shareholders, bid b must be greater or equal to the expected post-takeover security bene…ts generated by the acquirer, where the expectation is rationally taken over types X 00 ; X :
concept imposes that upon observing e b , the dispersed shareholders must believe that X 2 h f X 00 ; X i , and will, therefore, accept e b . Hence, no equilibrium with b > (1 ') X 00 + X =2 satis…es the credible beliefs criterion.
Consider now b = e b (1 ') f X 00 + X =2 and imagine a deviation to a lower b. Given that X 00 is de…ned by (2) for any arbitrary b, if we substitute b with b, b < e b implies b <
(1 ') X 00 + X 2 . Hence, any bid below (1 ') X 00 + X =2 will be rejected. There are two more conditions that needs to be satis…ed in the equilibrium under consideration: the incumbent must …nd it optimal to accept o¤er p and reject any p < p . Let us …rst consider the optimality of accepting p . The incumbent must have some beliefs about what happens upon rejection of p . These beliefs must be consistent with the equilibrium strategy of the acquirer who makes o¤er p and gets rejected. If her o¤er is rejected, the acquirer rationally decides whether to abstain or to go for a tender o¤er. Since the negotiations between the incumbent and the acquirer are unobservable to the market, the acquirer must bid at least b for the tender o¤er to be successful (the acquirer cannot prove that her X is actually below X 00 ); clearly she will bid exactly b . Consider now a deviation of the acquirer to e p < p such that (7) holds. Given that the incumbent accepts such an o¤er, all types from segment A 0 C 0 would want to deviate to e p , while all other types would not. At the same time, if the incumbent believes that an acquirer o¤ering e p belongs to A 0 C 0 , he would indeed accept the o¤er, since (5) still holds at e p . Thus, no equilibrium with p > e p survives the credible beliefs re…nement. In contrast, the equilibrium in which p = e p does survive the re…nement. Lowering p below p expands the set of acquirers who would want to deviate (to segment A 00 C 00 ), provided that p is accepted, in the same manner as when we lowered p to e p , with the same proportions of abstainers and those who go for a tender o¤er following rejection (A 00 D=DC 00 = A 0 D=DC 0 ). Therefore, (5) will cease to hold, which means that the incumbent will reject p when he believes that the raider belongs to A 00 C 00 .
Finally, for any given p < p there must exist belief such that (6) is satis…ed. There is generally a continuum of such beliefs for given p. In particular, we can set = (b X 0 ) =(X 00 X 0 ) for all p < p . Then, as follows immediately from (7), (6) holds for all p < p .
Proof of Lemma 8. I will …rst prove that for ' < 1=3 such equilibrium does not exist even without the requirement imposed by Grossman and Perry (1986) . Then I will show that whenever the "richest"equilibrium, i.e., the one de…ned in Lemma 7, exists, any equilibrium without block trades does not satisfy the credible beliefs criterion. As we have seen, the equilibrium from Lemma 7 exists if and only if ' 2 ( =(1 + ); 1). Since =(1 + ) < 1=3 for any < 1=2, I will then conclude that an equilibrium satisfying the credible beliefs criterion, in which no type does a block trade, exists for no value of '.
Assume an equilibrium without block trades by any type exists. Then it must be characterized by some threshold X = X T O such that all types with X 2 [0; X T O ] abstain from any transaction, and all types with X 2 X T O ; X acquire 100% of the …rm in a tender o¤er (we have proved in Lemma 6 that equilibria with tender o¤ers such that only the incumbent tenders do not exist). Type with X = X T O must be indi¤erent between bidding b and abstaining: X T O b = 0. As in the proof of the Lemma 7, the credible beliefs re…nement requires that b = E((1 ')X j b = b ) = (1 ')
. Hence, we obtain
First of all, it can be easily shown that '. It must be that no type prefers to deviate to a block trade. An acquirer prefers a block trade to abstaining whenever ((1 ')X p) + 'X > 0. This condition must hold for all types below X T O . Using the just derived expression for X T O , we conclude that any price p <
'
1+' (1 ' + '= )X must be rejected by the incumbent. Also, an acquirer prefers a block trade to a tender o¤er whenever ((1 ')X p) + 'X > X 1 ' 1+' X. This condition must hold for all types above X T O , which leads us to the same condition as above: any price p <
1+' (1 ' + '= )X must be rejected by the incumbent. The incumbent will reject price p whenever he thinks he will obtain more in expectation after rejection. If the incumbent rejects, either a tender o¤er or abstention will follow. In the former case, the incumbent will get b = 1 ' 1+' X. In the latter case, his payo¤ will be (1 ') X 2 + ' 1+' (1 ' + '= )X that the incumbent will accept, and, therefore, the equilibrium under consideration does not exist.
Suppose now ' 1=3. As =(1 + ) < 1=3 for any < 1=2, this automatically implies that the equilibrium of Lemma 7 exists. It is straightforward to derive that X T O 2 (X 0 ; X 00 ). Now we can use a geometrical argument similar to the one in Lemma 7 to show that the equilibrium under consideration does not meet the credible beliefs requirement. In Figure 5 point D 0 corresponds to X T O , and the upward-sloping line going through D 0 is the acquirer's payo¤ in the equilibrium under consideration. The upward sloping line passing through A (point where X = X 0 ) is the acquirer's payo¤ from a block trade at the equilibrium price de…ned in Lemma 2. The upward-sloping line going through point D is the acquirer's payo¤ from a tender o¤er at the equilibrium bid from Lemma 7. Consider the deviation of types from segment AC 0 to price p from Lemma 2. If p is accepted, they clearly want to deviate, while the rest of types will not. Will the incumbent accept p if he believes that such an o¤er is from a type on AC 0 ? The answer is yes. Following the argument similar to the one used in Lemma 7, AD 0 =D 0 C 0 = AD=DC. That is, the proportion of types who would go for a tender o¤er following rejection of p is the same regardless of the bid price the acquirer would pay in a tender o¤er. According to formula (7) from the proof of Lemma 7, the incumbent is indi¤erent between accepting p and rejecting it, when the bid is the equilibrium bid of Lemma 7. However, in the equilibrium under consideration the bid is lower than the bid from Lemma 7: it is equal to (1 ')
. Hence, the incumbent will strictly prefer to accept p , and the proposed equilibrium does not satisfy the criterion of Grossman and Perry (1986) .
Proof of Lemma 9. First of all, let us show that in such type of equilibrium p must be equal to (1 ')
Then the raider could deviate by o¤ering a lower p, get rejected and acquire control in a tender o¤er by bidding b = e p. Such a bid guarantees that at least the incumbent will tender his share. If E ((1 ')X j b = e p) > e p, only the incumbent will tender. This implies that any raider who is supposed to acquire the block at price p > e p would gain from the deviation. If E ((1 ')X j b = e p) < e p, all shareholders tender. If (1 ')X > e p, this means that the raider with X = X makes a pro…t on buying shares at e p, and, since e p < p , gains more from acquiring 100% of the company at e b than from buying just the incumbent's block at p (formally, X e p > (1 ')X p + 'X). If (1 ')X < e p, the raider with X = X prefers acquiring 100% at (1 ')X (the shareholders will accept such a bid) to buying just the incumbent's block at p , because she makes zero pro…t on buying shares at (1 ')X and negative pro…t on buying shares at p (formally, 'X > (1 ')X p + 'X). Thus, if p > (1 ') X 2 + ' X 2 , there is always a pro…table deviation at least for type X. Imagine now p < (1 ') X 2 + ' X 2 . If the negotiations fail, some types of raiders might go for a (successful) tender o¤er. Let us denote the out-of-equilibrium bid of such raiders by e b (if there are indeed types who would do a tender o¤er). Obviously, e b (1 ')X. Clearly, it must be that e b < p , for if it was not, the incumbent would never agree to price p . Indeed, he would then get strictly more in expectation by rejecting, unless e b = p and all types from X BT ; X go for a tender o¤er after rejection. But if all types from X BT ; X prefer acquiring 100% at e b to abstention 32 , then all these types also prefer acquiring 100% at e b to the block trade at p, since, as we know, the raider's payo¤ as a function of X is steeper in the case of a full acquisition. But if e b < p , then the type X would clearly gain by making a tender o¤er at e b, because she makes a pro…t from buying shares at e b (formally, X e b >
(1 ')X p + 'X). Thus, we have proved that p = (1 ') X 2 + ' X 2 . The type with X = X BT must be indi¤erent between acquiring the block and abstaining:
[(1 ')X BT p ] + 'X BT = 0; from which we obtain X BT = X=2. Now, we need two conditions to be satis…ed: the raider must be unable to gain from a tender o¤er, and the incumbent must …nd it rational to accept p .
Denote by b min the minimum bid at which the raider can acquire 100% of the company via a tender o¤er out of equilibrium. (In the equilibrium under consideration, if the dispersed 3 2 Since e b < (1 ')
, a successful tender o¤er implies that all shareholders tender.
shareholders observe a bid, they will form some out-of-equilibrium beliefs about X. For any given mapping from b into the distribution of beliefs, one can …nd the minimum b at which the dispersed shareholders will tender their shares.) In order to make the deviation us unattractive as possible, let us set b min is (1 ')X. Any shareholder would agree to sell at this price regardless of his beliefs, and we assume that for all b < (1 ')X the shareholders believe that E ((1 ')X j b) > b. We will later show that the credible beliefs criterion is satis…ed. For the raider not to deviate, it must be that, for any X 2 X=2; X the credible beliefs criterion, it must be that From (13) and (14) we obtain ' = p 2 + 8 2 4 2 2 e '( );
which can be shown to be increasing in . Moreover, one can easily derive that e '( ) = X BT , and e '(1) = X T O .
